Network Working Group R. Austein
Internet-Draft ISC
Expires: January 19, March 13, 2006 July 18, September 9, 2005

EDNS NSID Extension
draft-austein-dnsext-nsid-02

DNS Name Server Identifier Option (NSID)
draft-ietf-dnsext-nsid-00

Status of this Memo

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Abstract

With the increased use of DNS anycast, load balancing, and other
mechanisms allowing more than one DNS name server to share a single
IP address, it is sometimes difficult to tell which of a pool of name
servers has answered a particular query. While existing ad-hoc
mechanism allow an operator to send follow-up queries when it is
necessary to debug such a configuration, the only completely reliable
way to obtain the identity of the name server which actually responded is to
have the name server include this information in the response itself.
This note proposes defines a protocol extension to support this functionality.

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this functionality.

Table of Contents

1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1 Reserved Words . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Proposed Mechanism Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 . . . . . 3
2.1 The SI Flag . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3
2.2 The NSID Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.3 Presentation Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. What Should the Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1 The NSID Payload Be? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. Should Recursive Name Servers Respond to SI?
3.2 SI and NSID Are Not Transitive . . . . . . . . . 8
5. . . . . . 7
3.3 User Interface Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6. 8
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7. 8
6. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8. 8
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8.1 8
7.1 Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8.2 8
7.2 Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 9
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 9
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . 13 10

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1. Introduction

Existing ad-hoc mechanisms such as those described in [I-D.ietf-
dnsop-serverid] allow an operator to send follow-up
queries when it is necessary to debug such a configuration, but there
are situations in which this is not a totally satisfactory solution,
since anycast routing may have changed, or the server pool in
question may be behind some kind of extremely dynamic load balancing
hardware. Thus, while these ad-hoc mechanisms are certainly better
than nothing (and have the advantage of already being deployed), a
better solution seems desirable.

Given that a DNS query is an idempotent operation with no retained
state, it would appear that the only completely reliable way to
obtain the identity of the name server which actually responded to a
particular query is to have that name server include identifying
information in the response itself. This note proposes defines a protocol
enhancement to achieve this.

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1.1 Reserved Words

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

2. Proposed Mechanism Protocol

This note proposes using uses an EDNS [RFC2671] flag bit to signal the resolver's
desire for information identifying the name server, and an EDNS
option to hold the name server's response (should it choose to
honor the resolver's request). response, if any.

2.1 The SI Flag

A resolver signals its desire for information identifying the server
by setting the SI (Send Identification) flag in the extended flags
field of the OPT pseudo-RR.

The value of the SI flag is [TBD].

The semantics of the SI flag are not transitive. That is: the SI
flag is a request that the name server which receives the query
identify itself; in a so-called forwarding setup, itself. If the first hop name server side of a recursive name server
receives the SI bit, the client is asking the one that should recursive name server
to identify itself. If itself; if the resolver side of a forwarding the recursive name server

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wishes to receive identifying information, it is free to set the SI
flag in its own queries, but that is a separate matter.

A name server which understands the SI flag should SHOULD echo its value
back in the response message, regardless of whether the name server
chose to honor the request.

2.2 The NSID Option

A name server which understands the SI flag and chooses to honor it
responds by including identifying information in a NSID option in an
EDNS OPT pseudo-RR in the response message.

The OPTION-CODE for the NSID option is [TBD].

The OPTION-DATA for the NSID option is an opaque byte string the
semantics of which are deliberately left outside the protocol. See
Section 3 3.1 for discussion.

The NSID option is not transitive. A name server must not MUST NOT send an
NSID option back to a resolver which did not request it. In
particular, while a forwarder recursive name server may choose to set the SI
bit when
forwarding sending a query, this has no effect on the setting of the SI
bit or the presence or absence of the NSID option in the forwarder's recursive
name server's response to the original client.

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3. What Should the NSID Payload Be?

As stated in Section 2.1, this mechanism is not restricted to
authoritative name servers; the semantics are intended to be equally
applicable to recursive name servers.

2.3 Presentation Format

User interfaces MUST read and write the content of the NSID option as
a sequence of hexadecimal digits, two digits per payload octet.

The NSID payload is binary data. Any comparison between NSID
payloads MUST be a comparison of the raw binary data. Copy
operations MUST NOT assume that the raw NSID payload is null-
terminated. Any resemblance between raw NSID payload data and any
form of text is purely a convenience, and does not change the
underlying nature of the payload data.

See Section 3.3 for discussion.

3. Discussion

This section discusses certain aspects of the protocol and explains
considerations that led to the chosen design.

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3.1 The NSID Payload

The syntax and semantics of the content of the NSID option is
deliberately left outside the scope of this specification. This
section describe some of the kinds of data that server administrators
might choose to provide as the content of the NSID option, and
explains the reasoning (such as it is) behind choosing a simple opaque byte string.

There are several possibilities for the payload of the NSID option. option:
o It could be the "real" name of the specific name server within the
name server pool.
o It could be the "real" IP address (IPv4 or IPv6) of the name
server within the name server pool.
o It could be some sort of pseudo-random number generated in a
predictable fashion somehow using the server's IP address or name
as a seed value.
o It could be some sort of probabilisticly unique identifier
initially derived from some sort of random number generator then
preserved across reboots of the name server.
o It could be some sort of dynamicly generated identifier so that
only the name server operator could even tell whether or not any two
queries had been answered by the same server.
o It could be a blob of signed data, with a corresponding key which
might (or might not) be available via DNS lookups.
o It could be a blob of encrypted data, the key for which presumably
would could be
restricted to parties with a need to know (in the opinion of the
server operator).
o It could be an arbitrary string of octets chosen at the discretion
of the name server operator.

Each of these options has advantages and disadvantages. disadvantages:
o Using the "real" name is simple, but assumes that the name server
has may not have
a "real" name, which it may not. name.
o Using the "real" address is also simple, and the name server
almost certainly does have at least one non-anycast IP address for
maintenance operations, but assumes that the operator of the name server is may
not be willing to divulge its non-anycast address, which might

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not be the case. address.
o Given that one common reason for using anycast DNS techniques is
an attempt to harden a critical name server against denial of
service attacks, some name server operators are likely to want an
identifier other than the "real" name or "real" address of the
name server instance.
o Using a hash or pseudo-random number can provide a fixed length
value that the resolver can use to tell two name servers apart
without necessarily being able to tell where either one of them
"really" is, but makes debugging more difficult if one happens to
be in a friendly open environment. Furthermore, a nonce may hashing might not
add much value, since a hash based on an IPv4 address still only

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involves a 32-bit search space, and DNS names used for servers
that operators might have to debug at 4am tend not to be very
random at all.
random.
o Probabilisticly unique identifiers have similar properties to
hashed identifiers, but (given a sufficiently good random number
generator) are immune to the search space issues. However, the
strength of this approach is also its weakness: there is no
algorithmic transformation by which even the server operator can
associate name server instances with identifiers while debugging,
which might be annoying. This approach also requires the name
server instance to preserve the probabilisticly unique identifier
across reboots, but this does not appear to be a serious
restriction, since authoritative nameservers almost always have
some form of nonvolatile storage (such as a disk drive) in any case, and in the rare cases where case
of a name server that does not have any way to store such an
identifier, nothing terrible will happen if the name server just
generates a new identifier every time it reboots.
o Using an arbitrary octet string gives name server operators yet
another thing to configure, or mis-configure, or forget to
configure. Having all the nodes in an anycast name server
constellation identify themselves as "My Name Server" would not be
particularly useful.

Given all of the issues listed above, the best approach might be:

o Define there does not appear to be a
single solution that will meet all needs. Section 2.2 therefore
defines the NSID payload to be an opaque byte string, as specified
in Section 2.2. string and leaves the
choice up to the implementor and name server operator. The following
guidelines may be useful to implementors and server operators:
o Operators for whom divulging the unicast address is an issue could
use the raw binary representation of a probabilisticly unique
random number. This should probably be the default implementation
behavior.

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o Operators for whom divulging the unicast address is not an issue
could just use the raw binary representation of a unicast address
for simplicity. This would should only be done via an explicit
configuration choice by the operator.
o Operators who really need or want the ability to set the NSID
payload to an arbitrary value could do so, but this would should only be
done via an explicit configuration choice by the operator.

This approach appears to provide enough information for useful
debugging without unintentionally leaking the maintenance addresses
of anycast name servers to nogoodniks, while also allowing name
server operators who do not find such leakage threatening to provide
more information at their own discretion.

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4. Should Recursive Name Servers Respond to SI?

3.2 SI and NSID Are Not Transitive

As specified in Section 2.1 and Section 2.2, the SI flag and NSID
option are not transitive. This is strictly a hop-by-hop mechanism.

Most of the discussion of name server identification to date has
focused on identifying authoritative name servers, since the best
known cases of anycast name servers are a subset of the name servers
for the root zone. However, given that anycast DNS techniques are
equally
also applicable to recursive name servers as well as authoritative
name servers, it the mechanism may also be
useful for the with recursive name server side servers. The hop-by-hop semantics support
this.

While there might be some utility in having a transitive variant of
this mechanism (so that, for example, a stub resolver could ask a
recursive server to tell it which authoritative name server provided
a particular answer to support this mechanism as well. The the recursive name server), the semantics proposed of
such a variant would be more complicated, and are left for future
work.

3.3 User Interface Issues

Given the SI bit range of possible payload contents described in
Section 2.1 are 3.1, it is not possible to define a single presentation
format for the NSID payload that is efficient, convenient,
unambiguous, and aesthetically pleasing. In particular, while it is
tempting to use a presentation format that uses some form of textual
strings, attempting to support this would significantly complicate
what's intended to be a very simple debugging mechanism.

In some cases the content of the NSID payload may binary data only be
meaningful to the name server operator, and may not be meaningful to
the user or application, but the user or application must be able to
capture the entire content anyway in order for it to be useful.
Thus, the presentation format must support arbitrary binary data.

In cases where the name server operator derives the NSID payload from
textual data, a textual form such as US-ASCII or UTF-8 strings might
at first glance seem easier for a user to deal with. There are,
however, a number of complex issues involving internationalized text
which, if fully addressed here, would require a set of rules
significantly longer than the rest of this model. specification. See
[RFC2277] for an overview of some of these issues.

It is much more important for the NSID payload data to be passed
unambiguously from server administrator to user than it is for the
payload data data to be pretty while in transit. In particular, it's
critical that it be straightforward for a user to cut and paste an

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exact copy of the NSID payload output by a debugging tool into other
formats such as email messages or web forms without distortion.
Hexadecimal strings, while ugly, are also robust.

4. IANA Considerations

This mechanism requires allocation of one EDNS flag bit for the SI
flag (Section 2.1).

This mechanism requires allocation of one ENDS option code for the
NSID option (Section 2.2).

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5. Security Considerations

This document describes a channel signaling mechanism, intended
primarily for debugging. Channel signaling mechanisms are outside
the scope of DNSSEC per se. Thus, applications Applications that require integrity
protection for the data being signaled will need to use a channel
security mechanism such as TSIG [RFC2845].

Section 3 3.1 discusses a number of different kinds of information that
a name server operator might choose to provide as the value of the
NSID option. Some of these kinds of information are security
sensitive in some environments. This specification deliberately
leaves the syntax and semantics of the NSID option content up to the
implementation and the name server operator.

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6. Acknowledgements

Joe Abley, Harald Alvestrand, Mark Andrews, Roy Arends, Steve
Bellovin, Randy Bush, David Conrad, Johan Ihren, Daniel Karrenberg,
Mike Patton, Paul Vixie, Sam Weiler,
Suzanne Woolf, and Suzanne Woolf. Apologies to
anyone inadvertently omitted from the law firm of Dewey, Chetham, and Howe.

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8. above list.

7. References

8.1

7.1 Normative References

[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

[RFC2671] Vixie, P., "Extension Mechanisms for DNS (EDNS0)",
RFC 2671, August 1999.

[RFC2845] Vixie, P., Gudmundsson, O., Eastlake, D., and B.
Wellington, "Secret Key Transaction Authentication for DNS
(TSIG)", RFC 2845, May 2000.

8.2

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7.2 Informative References

[I-D.ietf-dnsop-serverid]
Conrad, D., "Identifying an Authoritative Name Server",
draft-ietf-dnsop-serverid-04 (work in progress),
March 2005.

[RFC2277] Alvestrand, H., "IETF Policy on Character Sets and
Languages", BCP 18, RFC 2277, January 1998.

Author's Address

Rob Austein
ISC
950 Charter Street
Redwood City, CA 94063
USA

Email: sra@isc.org

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